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Abstract 
The proposed bridge between Chiang Khong and Houay Xay will form the remaining crucial link of the 
Asian Highway 3, connecting Bangkok to Kunming, a project highly anticipated in the Greater Mekong 
Subregion's (GMS) development.With China funding half the cost of the bridge, it signifies a strong player 
in the economic borderland. The article seeks to uncover the locals' thoughts and feelings of the bridge to 
raise awareness of 'voices' from the Thai-Lao border in relation to the further destinations the bridge will 
serve. The local perceptions of the proposed bridge are used to provide a form of comprehension of 
anticipatory cross-border geopolitical relations between the Thai-Lao border and China. Drawing on the 
concepts of critical geopolitics, anti-geopolitics and geoeconomics, it concludes by underscoring the 
need to listen to local perceptions at the Thai-Lao border as they signal potential ill-feelings that could 
jeopardise future cross-border geopolitical ties and trade. 
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The proposed bridge between Chiang Khong and Houay Xay will form the 
remaining crucial link of the Asian Highway 3, connecting Bangkok to 
Kunming, a project highly anticipated in the Greater Mekong Subregion’s 
(GMS) development. With China funding half the cost of the bridge, it 
signifies a strong player in the economic borderland. The article seeks to 
uncover the locals’ thoughts and feelings of the bridge to raise awareness of 
‘voices’ from the Thai-Lao border in relation to the further destinations the 
bridge will serve. The local perceptions of the proposed bridge are used to 
provide a form of comprehension of anticipatory cross-border geopolitical 
relations between the Thai-Lao border and China. Drawing on the concepts 
of critical geopolitics, anti-geopolitics and geoeconomics, it concludes by 
underscoring the need to listen to local perceptions at the Thai-Lao border as 
they signal potential ill-feelings that could jeopardize future cross-border 

















INTRODUCTION- ONE BRIDGE, TWO TOWNS AND THREE COUNTRIES 
 
This is about places in the upper-Mekong borderlands and about the people who 
create and regulate commercial linkages between those places. My journeys through 
these places started- and finished- in the northern Thai town of Chiang Khong, a 
busy trading centre on the Mekong River border with Laos. … It was an ideal 
location to observe the regulation of trade and cross-border passage.1 
 
In his book The Legend of the Golden Boat, anthropologist Andrew Walker highlights an 
active cross-border trading zone in Chiang Khong (northern Thailand) and Houay Xay 
(northwestern Laos) in the upper Mekong River. Walker also alerts us to the visionary of 
an economic borderland called the “Upper Mekong Economic Quadrangle” which 
includes the two places mentioned above along with northeastern Burma and 
southwestern China (Yunnan Province).2 Slightly more than a decade has passed since 
Walker wrote the book. The visionary of an economic borderland encompassing 
mainland Southeast Asia and southwestern China still persists, albeit at a greater 
intensity. Over the years, in a bid to link northern Thailand and northwestern Laos better 
with Yunnan Province in China, new roads have been built and existing ones improved in 
the three countries.3 Currently, what is crucially lacking is a completed bridge connecting 
the towns of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay to achieve the goal of the visionary. Hence, 
our paper seeks to focus on the fourth Thai-Lao friendship bridge in construction at the 
border towns of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay.4 The proposed 480m long bridge will 
form the remaining crucial link of the Asian Highway 3. It will connect Bangkok, and 
potentially from faraway Singapore via the Malaysian peninsula to Kunming on an 
1800km long journey (see Figures 1, 2 and 3), a project which the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) envisages for the Greater Mekong Subregion’s (GMS) development.5 China 
and Thailand will each share half of the total cost of the bridge over a sum close to two 
billion baht (approximately 63 million USD), which is probably an underestimate as costs 
of materials and construction are increasing.6  
 
*********** 








Figure 3 here, Caption: Constructing a Bridge, Completing the Corridor (January 2012) 
*********** 
 
The purpose of this particular fourth bridge over the Mekong River goes far 
beyond connecting two points of the Thai-Lao border. As James Sidaway observes, trans-
frontier bridges are also, metaphorical spaces: serving variously the visions of state 
leaders, regional and provincial planners, and all manner of other agents viewing 
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potential closer cross-border ties, linking trans-national places, and allowing for new 
spaces for further investment.7 A bridge that connects two towns but serves the interests 
of three states across regional boundaries holds huge geopolitical symbolism for the 
proponents of the GMS.  However, in very material ways, the bridge can be viewed as 
one part of a much bigger regional process within the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
promoted GMS process, primarily creating new investment opportunities for ‘scale 
jumping’ capital, aiding easier and cheaper access to cross-border resources, through 
alliances between state bodies and transnational capital operating mostly outside of the 
local borderlands. As Jim Glassman has argued convincingly the ‘GMS is worth 
understanding for those of us living outside of it as an integral part in which processes of 
“globalization” and “regionalization” are occurring … the GMS can serve as a true 
metaphor for the world in which we all live’.8 
In our research area the proposed bridge encapsulates and represents important 
dimensions of a process of ‘building the GMS’ by completing the ‘final piece of the 
jigsaw puzzle’ to allow one travel seamlessly on road from Singapore to China in future, 
thus projecting out an enlarged area of economic opportunity.  This particular cross 
border bridge’s development in its metaphorical sense draws us to the ‘understanding of 
borders is not so much their material morphology, but the various forms of interpretation 
and representation that they embody’.9 With China funding half the cost of the bridge, it 
not only speaks of China’s interest in the Thai-Lao border towns of Chiang Khong and 
Houay Xay, but also signifies China’s southern regional thrust into the political economic 
borderlands of mainland Southeast Asia. In addition, we recognize the potential geo-
economic transformations that may arise, including deepening socio-economic 
disparities, which may benefit some borderland agents but marginalize others. Thus, we 
argue that further grounded research is necessary to appreciate how such cross-border 
developments play out in the actual borderlands. The bridge project is already opening up 
new scales of economic activity, as Bangkok and Chinese investors are speculatively 
buying up land near to the project. Undoubtedly there will be socio-economic and 
geopolitical ramifications at the scale of the local borderlands, thus we are concerned 
with anticipatory geographies. 
 Our anticipatory geographies are future-oriented modes of visioning a place’s 
(re)development, encompassing a material force that has important practical 
consequences.10 Anticipatory geographies about an envisioned future is also closely tied 
to imaginative geographies, meaning the representations that (re)development in 
economic borderlands are suggestive of, and the visualizations behind these. Derek 
Gregory has examined imaginative geographies as functions to the unexamined 
assumptions of space and spatial relations, which serve to frame diverse geographical 
phenomenon in political discourses.11 What could be anticipatory and imaginary in nature 
requires some ethnographic details, and in this paper we are primarily concerned about 
what borderland residents have to say about the bridge development and some of the 
changes it may bring. Hence, we unpack the expectations and perceptions of 
(re)developing an economic borderland, specifically (in our research) from people who 
live in the border towns, where their livelihoods are most likely to experience changes 
given the physical transformations to the landscape and flows of people and goods by the 
proposed bridge being most evident at the border. The anticipatory geographies’ focus 
then serves as a device to highlight the importance of local perceptions from Thai-Lao 
Page 3 of 28 Geopolitics
border of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay to approach the heart of the subject matter- the 
anticipatory transnational cross-border relationship between the Thai-Lao border and 
China arising from the bridge. In other words, this means a study of anticipatory 
geopolitical relations at the scale of the borderlands. 
The next two sections of the paper provide a review of (re)development of 
economic borderlands in relation to our conceptual debates on anticipatory geographies 
and anticipatory geopolitics, and some specific earlier socio-economic accounts of the 
Mekong borderlands for its empirical relevance. We also strongly believe in the salience 
of grounded political geography fieldwork as one strategy to examine broader 
geopolitical and geoeconomic issues, which are highlighted in our research 
methodologies. This relates to calls for ‘a more geographical geopolitics’, and supports 
those who advocate ethnographic methods, used alongside others, as ‘a helpful tool to 
build up a fuller understanding of geopolitics and international relations’.12 As will be 
apparent, the local perceptions gathered reflect differing views compared with the 
governments involved in the megaproject, and in some cases, revealing localized 
anxieties toward livelihood challenges posed by the proposed bridge. In the light of these 
observations, we argue that the Thai and Lao central governments should seriously 
engage with borderlands residents and address the local concerns of people living in the 
border towns of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay, particularly as there are anxieties about 
the rapidly growing extra-territorial influence of China’s economy, migrants and trade 
within the GMS borderlands.  
 
ANTICIPATORY GEOGRAPHIES, ANTICIPATORY GEOPOLITICS AND 
ECONOMIC BORDERLANDS 
 
Over the last two decades, economic borderlands receive great attention from 
geographers in the backdrop of a so called ‘borderless’ world.13 However, this 
‘borderless’ world perception is highly misleading as economic borderlands and its 
capital still function in multi-layered compartments determined by political boundaries.14 
Economic borderlands do function in political boundaries that separate nation states, but 
they do not necessarily restrict cross-border trade interactions. Some economic 
borderlands consist of bustling cross-border towns and account for significant exchanges 
of trade, labour and investment, which are taking place in several parts of the intensively 
researched European Union border zones15, and the US-Mexico borderlands, such as 
Tijuana (Mexico)/San Diego (USA)16, and Hong Kong/Shenzhen (China).17 Studies of 
larger Asian economic borderlands include the Upper Mekong River region, which 
encompasses the borderlands of northwestern Laos, northern Thailand, northeastern 
Burma, and Southwestern China18, and the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth 
Triangle.19 We recognize that previous and current works on economic borderlands have 
done well to focus on getting insights from the borderlands to tease out the intensity and 
extent to which (re)development projects affect people on both sides of the border. To 
provide an example, we refer to the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle. 
Grundy-Warr, Peachey and Perry argue how this particular economic borderland in 
Southeast Asia is a reflection of fragmented integration against the global economy 
because the surrounding environments of the flagship projects which took place saw 
limited progress and success.20 By carrying out grounded research, borderlands 
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scholarship examines processes that include analysis of top-down perspectives, but also 
incorporate many individual border narratives and experiences.21 However, there appear 
to be two angles that do require more research attention. First, research tends to skirt 
around anticipatory geographies’ on economic borderlands (with Matt Sparke’s work an 
exception to the rule22) and borders’ issues at large, which limits the potential to be 
critically informative to contemporary and future (re)development projects affecting the 
economic frontiers. Second, anticipatory geographies leads to considerations of future 
transnational cross-border geopolitical relationships between the border towns, external 
actor(s), and the requisite state agencies involved.  
Next, borders with their material meanings and practices tend to be interpreted 
and represented as ‘windows’ offering views onto the world’s geopolitics, or are part of 
the geopolitics themselves.23 However, if borders are to be more connected with 
geopolitics, we need to arm ourselves with relational geographies and broader regional 
ties. As Massey persuasively argues, places must be thought more as routes rather than 
roots.24 Borders are places that witness movement of people, investment and goods. 
Borders are not inflexible, static venues where there is no related connection to other 
places. This is especially true in the case of the Thai-Lao border and China, two areas 
enthusiastically promoted by the ADB as a region of competitiveness and connectivity in 
the GMS.25 Although earlier works by Walker and Hill have acknowledged the existence 
of Chinese merchants in the history of trade exchanges with mainland Southeast Asia 
through caravans and river trading in the Mekong River26, the intensity of exchanges now 
will be greatly increased with the upcoming bridge. The proposed bridge in its material 
form will bring even more people and goods across Thailand to Laos and vice versa, and 
its interpretations and representations go more than just the two towns of Chiang Khong 
and Houay Xay. In reality, it must be remembered that the bridge is half-funded by 
China, and perceived to bring more Chinese people, investment and goods into the Thai-
Lao border. The proposed bridge in the GMS’s economic borderland is physically 
between Thailand and Laos, but speaks of wider relational geographies with external 
actor(s), specifically China. Thus, the proposed bridge finds itself appropriated as a 
metaphor for the wider trajectory of anticipatory cross-border geopolitical relations27 
between the Thai-Lao border and China. 
 
GEO-BODIES, UPPER MEKONG BORDERLANDS AND RIVERSCAPE 
 
The geographical imaginary of the GMS is relatively new, but regional trade links along 
and across the Mekong have connected the borderlands with distant places for centuries. 
Our focus in on a present-day bridge development and anticipatory geographies, but it is 
necessary to contextualize current developments within a deeper historical-temporal 
geographical context. The upper-Mekong region has a long history of spatial competition 
over the control of trade routes, strategic natural resources, and cross-river connections.28 
Furthermore, the ‘upper-Mekong communities have had longstanding experience of 
managing uneven and unequal connections with other places’.29 However, the current 
regionalization processes symbolized by the bridge may lead to intensified processes of 
uneven development within the contemporary borderlands, as local authorities and people 
have to deal with new central state regulation, trade agreements, public-private sector 
involvement dominated by national cores, and transnational capital investments.30 
Page 5 of 28
Looking at the past indicates that we should be cautious in our projections about 
anticipatory geographies, geopolitics and geo-economics. For the upper-Mekong 
borderlands should not be viewed purely from a center-periphery perspective as rural, 
isolated backwaters, distant from national power domains, and easily exploited by 
external interests. Prior to the creation of the fixed river boundary now delineating Laos 
and Thailand, there existed in the 19th century a Nan trans-Mekong tributary state within 
which Chiang Khong was a highly strategic cross-river outpost, controlling tolls and 
taxes on river trade, ferry services across and down river, as well as trans-“Golden 
Triangle”31 caravan traffic from China into the Mekong heartlands.32 Chiang Khong 
served as a vital port between Nan, the Lanna Kingdom (northern Thailand) and and 
Luang Prabang (in current-day Laos).  
Imposing territorial ‘geo-bodies’ in the Mekong region, particularly between the 
Siamese and former French colonial authorities, was often a ‘violent’ business in several 
areas where surveying and mapping was usually backed up by military force.33 The 
conceptualization of ‘geo-body’ owes much to Robert Sack’s theory of human 
territoriality34, although Thongchai applies the notion to an historical examination of 
modern political geography in the making of Siam as a bounded nation.35 By the end of 
the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century, the Siamese authorities were just as 
capable and eager as their European rivals, Britain and France, to settle ‘ambiguous 
space.’ ‘The power of the new geographical knowledge exercised by both the Siamese 
and the French forces prevailed and created a new kind of space’.36 However, there were 
many areas where the Siamese and the French were uncertain where to place the political 
‘interface’ between the emerging geo-bodies. Attempts to delimit new spheres of 
undiluted sovereignty was not a project that could be completed neatly by delineating 
boundaries, because places on ‘either side’ had previously enjoyed looser non-territorial 
forms of political tribute and allegiance, often to more than one overlord, and the people 
viewed the river-space as a uniting rather than a dividing one. Furthermore, the French 
colonial authorities failed to fully bring the upper-Mekong territories under their full 
administrative control. ‘Boundaries were re-drawn, but the French were unable to 
translate the discursive power of colonial maps into a new regulatory regime’.37 Until the 
present-day, cross-border and intra-regional ties have flourished, and it is ‘connectedness’ 
and inseparable ties between ‘local’ and ‘non-local’ power that characterize this part of 
the upper-Mekong borderlands more than relative ‘isolation’38 and exploitative relations 
with ‘external’ forces. 
Political geo-bodies are definitely not the only way to conceptualize socio-spatial 
relations. Daily trans-river and down-river traffic, as well as trans-frontier social and 
blood ties, help to mould a distinctive cultural riverscape. Whilst the coming of modern 
political geography enabled the Mekong River to be divided by international boundaries 
along several long stretches of its course, thus partially displacing ‘indigenous tributary 
space’ with new ‘geo-bodies’39, it could not wipe clean the sense of ‘cultural community’ 
along many stretches of Siam – Laos border.40 Kinship and cultural ties forged over 
centuries in the era before international boundaries, did not completely vanish, although 
relations adapted over time as a result of central state nation-building, various forms of 
state regulation of border crossing-points, taxation, and so on.  
The boundary in the Mekong River became ‘one of the best (or worst) examples 
of the non-conformity of political borders to ethnic distributions’ for there were nine 
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times as many ethnic Laotians in Thailand than there were in Laos. People ‘share the 
river’, its ways of life, and through intermarriage and kin relations people have contacts 
across river, and they also share a social calendar with key Buddhist ceremonies and river 
festivals uniting both sides. These relations and exchanges are cultural, not geopolitical, 
and arise from a strong ‘family feeling or kinship rather than any particular associations 
with governments or states.’ Thus, Mekong River- border-scapes are akin to close-knit 
cross-border ‘neighbourhoods.’ The river itself has become a common space that 
frequently subverts the notion of rigid and fixed geo-bodies, as fishers from each side of 
the river often meet on the rocks, reefs and sand-bars within the river, and there are daily 
localized trans-border transgressions of the actual boundary.41 
Social ‘relations’ have transformed local people’s views of the river and border. 
From an anthropological perspective: ‘The “border riverscape” entails relations and 
perceptions toward a particular location where the porosity of border and fluidity of river 
coincide. The ‘scape’ of each agency is derived from, and shaped by, its vista, 
impression, interactions, and meanings given to the space and situated in the matrix of 
relations’ of agencies on both sides in relation to those using the river.42 As in other parts 
of the Mekong, ‘people come and go easily’ across the border, ‘they cross to visit, to 
socialize, to consult, to worship and to work.’ School children from the Lao side cross the 
river to attend classes on the Thai side. Lao women traders regularly sell goods in the 
Chiang Khong market. Thais often purchase consumer goods from the ‘Chinese market’ 
in Chiang Khong. These are some of the multiple, everyday and banal forms of mobility 
and exchange across and within the river, which are considered normal by border 
residents, incorporating regulated and unregulated forms of activity. They represent some 
of the myriad ways in which local agencies and agents recognize, negotiate, transgress, 
and transcend national geo-bodies.  
In fact the presence of Chinese traders has a long history associated with caravan 
routes and river traffic, including long-standing Chinese settlements in some parts of 
north-western Laos and northern Thailand. Thus, the current GMS initiatives are 
unremarkable in terms of historical Chinese mobility, trade and settlement, but may prove 
more disruptive within the border region insofar as distant Chinese and highly mobile 
transnational capital are the prime movers and economic beneficiaries of the bridge, 
highway and associated investments. Indeed, from sub-national trans-border perspectives, 
the development of a new transnational bridge is not vital to economic integration. Local 
people have numerous long-established and binding social, economic and cultural ties 
that transcend centralized notions of sovereign geo-bodies. In effect, the new bridge 
project is part of a much bigger scale geo-economic geographical GMS imaginary, 
supported by national governments, aided by the ADB, and strongly spearheaded by 
Chinese investments. This geo-imaginary builds on an earlier geometric imaginary of ‘the 
Economic Quadrangle’ (a vast cross-regional border zone encompassing parts of China, 
Myanmar, Laos and Thailand mentioned in the introduction), pushed by regional 
entrepreneurs, development-planners of key state ministries (trade, energy and transport 
in particular), investors, business associations, and backed by the ADB (see Figure 1). It 
is more relevant for us to consider how these regional goals, and the bridge that links 
Chiang Rai Province by road to Southwest China, is going to affect the borderlands, 
disrupt the older local and non-local connections, and transform aspects of the riverscape 
and cross-border river life in future.  




GROUNDED POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES 
 
Adopting grounded field-based political geography research can yield much about the 
dynamics of multi-scalar regionalization through an in-depth examination of particular 
prestige projects such as trans-border bridges. Uncovering local voices about a major 
trans-border project is arguably able to shed light on a range of issues that link the sub-
national trans-national scale with bigger issues of regionalization, uneven development, 
and geopolitical relations between participating agencies, particularly the three states 
involved in this particular GMS project.  
First, the local perceptions of the proposed bridge at the Thai-Lao border of 
Chiang Khong and Houay Xay will be highlighted. By local perceptions, we mean those 
people living in the two towns, not necessarily in the sense they have to be pure Thai or 
Laotian. Our research stems from an initial fieldwork conducted December 2010 and 
January 2011 by the first author, and most recently by a follow-up research by the second 
author in January 2012. Even though we have a basic understanding of the Thai 
language43, a translator helped the author(s) during fieldwork so as to prevent 
misinterpretations. A total of twenty-four individuals (thirteen in Thailand and eleven in 
Laos) were interviewed. As for our choice of interviewees, we have chosen people on 
both sides of the border that are likely to be affected by the upcoming bridge in terms of 
earnings and livelihood. These include individuals, who work at the construction sites 
and river ports, owners of restaurants, guesthouses, travel agencies and shops that sell 
household items, villagers who stay close to the proposed bridge, and one who is part of 
an environmental group (Rak Chiang Khong) that seeks to preserve and protect the 
Mekong River’s ecosystem.  Rak Chiang Khong are a locally significant environmental 
lobby group, and by interviewing someone from there is not merely soliciting ‘anti-
bridge’ sentiments, but aimed to get a cross-section of differing opinions from local 
stakeholders. Focusing on these borderland perspectives is central in a part of the upper 
Mekong region where there are numerous transnational cross-border activities involving 
Chinese who move across the Chinese border and reside in Laos or Thailand. It is our 
intention to uncover various borderland viewpoints about the trans-border bridge which is 
envisaged as one catalyst of grandiose regional infrastructure integration schemes likely 
to benefit metropolitan centres of power more than the towns most directly involved.  
Second, the local perceptions of the proposed bridge provide clues concerning 
anticipatory cross-border geopolitical relations between the Thai-Lao borderlands and 
China. Our research in two strategic GMS border towns has tried to add localized 
‘voices’, visions, and viewpoints to an understanding of larger scale processes that are 
driving the whole GMS concept. Subnational borderland perspective often diverge from 
dominant GMS regional and state-centred discourses, or at least provide local knowledge 
of actual and potential consequences of specific GMS projects. Hence, research within 
Chiang Khong and Houay Xai sheds more light on real and imagined geographies 
relating to specific cross-border infrastructure projects, which also have geopolitical 
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ANTICIPATING THE CHINESE PRESENCE 
With China’s growing financial clout and assiduously pursued economic relations 
undertaken with Thailand and Laos, the proposed bridge must be read more than just a 
Chinese investment. The Thai – China FTA makes this bridge ‘a high priority site,  and 
perhaps most significant, are the growing interests of China as well as Chinese businesses 
moving into the area’.44 The bridge acts as springboard to speed up exports of Chinese 
goods into mainland Southeast Asia and spur Chinese migrants to seek economic 
opportunities south of Yunnan. Having said this, the increasing Chinese presence 
represents a complex mix of problems and opportunities, which will play out distinctly 
for different sectors, in different countries and between different actors.45 Hence, this 
particular section reviews the current concerns of the people living in Chiang Khong and 
Houay Xay regarding the future bridge and the increasing Chinese presence in terms of 
economic competition for livelihood and goods, and unpacks very different responses 
from both sides of the border. The analysis of the empirical data thus facilitates the 
understanding of the anticipatory transnational cross-border geopolitical ties between the 
Thai-Lao border and China.  
 Thai import-export ferry operators interviewed expressed concerns that they 
might have to shift their businesses to the bridge in future, which present a different 
working environment.46 The worries shared by the Thai import-export ferry operators are 
not surprising, considering that the proposed bridge offers a direct alternative to river 
transport. However, we should not just be concerned with the infrastructural impact of 
the bridge. With the proposed bridge acting as a symbolic piece of infrastructure to 
connect the Chinese, Lao and Thai economies closer, perceptions on the Chinese capital 
that funds half of it generates more insights to the anticipatory geopolitical relations 
between the Thai-Lao border and China. As we interviewed people in Chiang Khong on 
the representations of Chinese investment via the bridge, opinions from a villager and a 
tour agent respectively reflect a wary view on the impending increased Chinese presence 
and a pessimistic outlook on their economic livelihood: 
 
The Chinese are rich. They have the money to invest, and can look for local 
businessmen to partner and buy our land. Poor people like me can only be 
employees.47 
 
Now you can see more and more Chinese touring, exchanging currency and 
shopping here. I see them as prospective investors in Chiang Khong and Chiang Rai, 
but I don’t think it may be good for us. I don’t foresee an equal sharing of benefits.48 
 
On the other hand, the Chinese presence across the border in Houay Xai provides a 
glimpse of an optimistic outlook as a construction worker, opines: 
 
The bridge project was looking for people to provide labour, so I’m happy I got a 
job. The Chinese company pays me quite well so I can support my family better 
with this income.49 
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His sentiment was echoed by a few others who agreed to his assessment. However, we 
learnt of something the Laotians may be unaware of. A Chinese surveyor at the 
construction site shared with us the reason why the Chinese company employs Laotians: 
 
We help them to build the bridge but the Lao government states that we have to use 
Laotian labour for most construction workers. Only those in planning positions can 
be Chinese. It’s legal so we have to follow.50 
 
In this sense, the Laotian construction workers’ satisfied feelings may not last long as 
once the bridge is completed, they have to seek jobs elsewhere. Also, as mentioned in a 
newspaper report, 
 
One telling example is the thousands of Chinese who have come to work on the 
Asian Development Bank-funded Route 3 in northern Laos that runs from the 
Chinese border, through the Lao town of Luang Nam Tha, and down to the Thai 
border. Many of the workers have stayed on and opened shops or found other work 
after their construction contracts ended.51 
 
Hence, the Chinese construction workers of this bridge project may similarly choose to 
stay on and compete with the locals for jobs in the future.  
 The anticipation of the Chinese presence also translates into the topic of Chinese 
goods. As a newspaper account and an interview demonstrate: 
 
The politicians responsible for bulldozing these ideas into practice should visit 
Chiang Saen or Chiang Khong on the Mekong River and count the number of 
heavily laden barges arriving from China on an hourly basis. Cheap goods and fruit 
unloaded from these boats give little comfort to our farmers and manufacturers, 
many of whom simply cannot compete.52 
  
The bridge means Chinese goods will arrive faster in Thailand. It is just a matter of 
hours. The bridge will be well connected to other roads. Traders don’t need to use 
the boats which are slower and have to depend on the water level in the Mekong… 
Thailand exports fruits mainly to China… China, they export almost everything.53 
  
Whether via the river or the proposed bridge, the view on having Chinese goods on Thai 
soil does not seem to go down well with the local Thais. With the signing of the 
Thailand-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2003, trade frictions occur frequently 
over agricultural produce.54 In particular, the severely dampened prices of Thai garlic to 
as low as 17 baht per kilogram in 2008 caused by smuggled Chinese garlic saw the Thai 
government moving in to place garlic on a list of goods with state controlled prices.55 As 
such, Chinese goods are seen as direct competition in Thailand, and the bridge is 
imagined to exacerbate the situation in future. Already, many Chinese manufactured 
goods are sold in border markets, not only in Houay Xay, but also in Tachilek a bustling 
border town of Myanmar, opposite the ‘sister city’ of Mae Sai, Chiang Rai Province.  
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Over in Houay Xay, a different scenario emerges as far as attitudes to the 
increasing Chinese commercial presence are concerned. Through interviews with the 
locals, it seems that Chinese goods are welcomed: 
 
There is a Chinese market about 4km away from the town. There are many different 
items on sale and they are cheap.56 
 
I like to use Chinese products. My motorcycle is from China. Laos does not produce 
its own motorcycles.57 
 
Their comments are supported by a Chinese wholesaler working in the Chinese market 
whom remarked that Chinese products are cheap and are quite good in quality, also 
offering Laotians something which their country does not produce for them.58 The 
differing sentiments in Houay Xay as compared to Chiang Khong are most likely to be 
attributed to the fact that Laos does not produce many consumer goods on its own, and 
thus Chinese goods are seen as value for money purchases.  
Following Power and Mohan59, we concur that China’s growing economic 
strength means that it is unlikely to have a partnership of equals with Laos and Thailand. 
This particular bridge in construction is an exemplar of how China’s growing strength is 
perceived on the ground at Chiang Khong and Houay Xay in current concerns and future 
imaginaries. Our fieldwork has uncovered the pressing need to consider local voices from 
the borders because these voices encompass something of an ‘anti-geopolitical eye’60 that 
counters the dominant geopolitical scripts of China’s rise, such as Robert Kaplan’s 
remark in the influential Foreign Affairs magazine that ‘it is with relatively weak states of 
Southeast Asia that the emergence of a Greater China is meeting the least resistance’.61 
We should remember that grounded realties are more diverse and complex.  
Undoubtedly, Chinese bilateral investments, aid and trade with each of the Lower 
Mekong countries have tended towards state-centered emphases on economic relations 
and national goals without critical examination of regional social and environmental 
costs, such as in relation to unilateral upper mainstream hydropower developments 
already underway along the Lancang, China’s name for the Mekong River.62 However, 
Kaplan’s simplifications miss multiple forms of resistance within those states to some of 
China’s regional aims. For instance, China’s plans to turn the upper Mekong mainstream 
into a super highway for trade through a navigational channel improvement project, first 
mooted in the early 1990s, and officially started in April 200063, also entailed that reefs 
and rocks in sections of the river between China and Luang Prabang in Laos must be 
blasted away by dynamite. However, this grandiose navigation project was only partially 
successful, for local Thai opposition groups, supported by national and regional NGOs, 
campaigned against the damage the reef blasting would do to livelihoods, fisheries and 
biodiversity.64 Eventually, the Thai Ministry of Defense opposed blasting in the Thai-Lao 
zone due to unresolved positional boundary issues65, but the voices of groups such as Rak 
Chiang Khong66 continue to reverberate through the Lower Mekong.  
Thus, the ‘least resistance’ from Southeast Asia as suggested may not materialize, 
and Chiang Khong and Houay Xay may resent China’s growing clout. Although the 
interviews revealed only worries and frustrations in Chiang Khong and a welcoming 
attitude in Houay Xay to the impending Chinese presence, worries may escalate (Chiang 
Khong) or joy could be short-lived (Houay Xay) in the future. As David Ley notes, 
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‘flows of migrants follow paths of economic opportunity’67, the economic borderland of 
Chiang Khong and Houay Xay are imagined as future ‘economic boom’ towns with the 
bridge acting as a ‘magnet’ to attract even more Chinese capital and citizens. Competition 
from increasing quantities of cheap Chinese goods coming through the future bridge 
could easily trigger even more outbursts in Chiang Khong. In Houay Xay, if the Chinese 
presence increases and reaches a level like that in Boten68 (see Figure 2) where the 
Chinese dominate the local economy69, cheap Chinese goods may not sound pleasing to 
Laotian ears anymore if most job opportunities go to the Chinese. 
While strong social movements acting as anti-geopolitical measures70 may not 
surface in time, we cannot discount other manifestations of resistance, such as small 
protests that sow practical alternatives for a life beyond the Chinese presence. Hence, the 
concerns expressed in our work and any form of future resistance would then be telling 
clues on the anticipatory cross-border geopolitical relations between the Thai-Lao border 
and China, where geopolitical ties could be strained due to persistent geoeconomic 
inequalities and the uneasiness of having so many Chinese migrants at Chiang Khong and 
Houay Xay. The expected strains on geopolitical relations are perhaps far off from 
triggering a border war, but certainly put Thais and Laotians in a heightened state of 
worry about everyday life concerns. 
 
 
ANTICIPATING THE THAI AND LAO CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
Everyone looks at the opportunity. It’s not China alone. Thailand and Laos want the 
bridge too. If there are potential benefits for them, any government would want the 
bridge.71 
 
In the economic borderland of the GMS, Thailand and Laos are seeking to have a share 
of the trading pie along with ‘massive’ China. It is in this opportunistic sense that 
Thailand has promoted the internationalization of capital, and became more 
internationalized72, and Laos inviting foreign aid to pursue infrastructure projects.73 Thus, 
it is also critical to engage the imaginaries of the Thai and Lao central governments 
towards the proposed bridge. This is required as Thailand and Laos have their own 
political and economic policies to implement through the bridge. In particular, Thailand’s 
usage of the term ‘Gateway to Indochina’ for Chiang Khong is investigated on whether it 
strikes a chord with the people living in the border town (see Figure 4).74 As Kuus rightly 
points out, we should take note not only of what the states say in their content of 
arguments, but also the context of delivery and process of the arguments’ production.75 
With these reminders taken note, we seek to uncover how the policies undertaken by 
Thailand and Laos to compete with China for the benefits of the proposed bridge 
influence the anticipatory transnational cross-border geopolitical relationship between the 
Thai-Lao border and China in two angles, which are the clash of imaginaries and the 




Figure 4 here, Caption: Chiang Khong is the Place to Invest in 
*********** 
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While the construction of the proposed bridge at Chiang Khong and Houay Xay 
started recently, the plans and visions for the bridge were brought up about two decades 
ago. Andrew Walker notes that in the 1990s, Thailand and Laos conceptualized the idea 
of having a bridge and surrounding roads paved to improve trade links with Yunnan 
province of China.76 However, it is in the last few years that the bridge idea started to 
materialize as affordability was a main deterrence in the 1990s. Now aided with Chinese 
funding for at least half the bridge’s cost, high hopes are pinned on it to propel Chiang 
Khong and Houay Xay into prosperity, as illustrated in the notion of it being a ‘Golden 
Gate to Indochina’ (see Figure 3). The prosperity belief is echoed by an engineer who is 
employed by the Thai central government to the bridge’s construction: 
 
I think this bridge will attract more development for Chiang Khong and Houay Xay. 
It is definitely a ‘Gateway to Indochina’.77 
 
The issues highlighted here speak of the respective Thai and Laos governments’ beliefs 
and aims to give China a run for its own money and claim their own spatial imaginary 
desires via the bridge project. 




The bridge is being built according to the city’s motto of being the ‘Gateway to 
Indochina’. It is not a ‘Chiang Khong People’s Bridge’. The construction company 




There will be a spa resort and a hotel built near the bridge. But I don’t think many 
people in Houay Xay can afford to use the facilities.79 
  
These comments underscore serious considerations raised by some excluded 
‘voices’ from the border towns. While the Thai and Lao central governments have their 
own ideas to promote trade links with China through the proposed bridge, their actions 
result in disagreements of policies, and even place worries for the people who live in 
Chiang Khong and Houay Xay in terms of the anticipatory geographies uncovered. In 
particular, the next sub-section looks at the land acquisition carried out by both 
governments which will influence the cross-border ties with China in future. 
Also, in their bids to capitalize on the anticipatory geographies of wealth and 
prosperity through the proposed bridge, the Lao and Thai governments have started to 
acquire significant plots of land from the villagers near the bridge at Baan Vieng May and 
Baan Don Mahawan in Houay Xay and Chiang Khong respectively. These two villages 
are where the proposed bridge is constructed at both ends and are approximately ten km 
away from the towns of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay. Specifically, the lands that have 
been acquired from the villagers on both sides of the border are mostly farmland and are 
seen as future ‘goldmines’ by the central governments. It has also been revealed through 
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the interviews that Chinese businessmen are subsequent buyers and/or leaseholders of 
several plots of land acquired by the governments from the people living in Chiang 




I can see the price of land increasing. This is especially so in the land close to the 
bridge. It can cost up to 1 million over baht per rai.80 The government buys up the 
land. I also heard Chinese businessmen bought land in Chiang Khong through their 
Thai partners.81 
 
You see the land over there? The village people own it last time. Now the 
government bought up all already. The government compensated us 300,000 to 
400,000 baht per rai. This place will look so different next time.82 
 
Houay Xay, 
The Lao government took back some of the village’s land for development. They 
gave us compensation but it’s very low. We asked for more compensation but it is 
not allowed. We cannot do anything about it, so we just sell to the government.83 
 
The government said land must be acquired to widen roads… I think our agricultural 
land is going to be leased to foreigners, like the Chinese and maybe Thais too.84 
 
The land issue is particularly sensitive to villagers, and their expressed discontent 
towards their governments is mainly due to the insufficient compensation. Things get 
more complex when subsequent land sale and lease transactions are concluded with the 
Chinese, such as one example where the Lao government has awarded a group of 
Chinese investors a concession to lease and develop a plot of land covering about 5,169 
rai into a major trade and tourism complex.85 Another example goes deeper in Thailand, 
where ‘Chinese merchants often marry people of Thai nationality, and purchase Thai real 
estate, including agricultural land; the produce is then exported back to China’.86 As 
another updated fieldwork interview in early 2012 reinforces that the bridge development 
may actually have little impact on local borderland businesses,  a Chiang Khong 
entrepreneur who runs a business selling precious and unusual rocks from the river, 
commented that: ‘this is not “pattanaa (development) Chiang Khong or Houay Xai”, this 
is “pattanaa GMS and Asia”’.87 He observes that land has already been bought at very 
cheap prices in the vicinity of the bridge, mostly by Bangkok-based and Chinese 
concerns, and since then land prices are sky-rocketing near the bridge zone. He also 
suggested that Highway 3 and the proposed future rail link would largely benefit China, 
Yunnan and distant Bangkok, Lampang and Chiang Mai more than the people in the 
borderlands. This is a common local viewpoint and one that resonates with the notion of 
‘scale-jumping’ and uneven development processes relating to the larger regionalization 
associated with the GMS. 
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In this empirical section, we highlighted the clashes of imaginaries and expectations of 
the of the proposed bridge over at the border towns of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay 
between the central governments and the people living in the border towns. Critical 
geopolitics is pertinent to study the reasons of the clashes. Oftentimes, ‘the media and 
politicians are storytellers- and in order for their stories to be accepted by their audience 
they have to resonate with meta-level hegemonic cultural values’.88 Both the Lao and 
Thai central governments sought the people in the border towns for backing in the form 
of conceptualizing complex geopolitical and geoeconomic issues with China for the share 
of the growing wealth in the GMS, and make them comprehensible to the people through 
the power of discourses such as the ‘Gateway to Indochina’. But in the context of the Lao 
and Thai central governments, their ‘stories’ of ‘Gateway to Indochina’ and promised 
prosperity are not envisaged by most of the people (especially villagers) living in Houay 
Xay and Chiang Khong. More broadly, the failure reflects the need to ‘create a public 
political culture that demands, requires and values grounded geographical knowledge 
over geopolitical sloganizing’.89 
Specifically, the land conflict issues arising through the anticipatory geographies 
in Chiang Khong and Houay Xay are raised with great urgency, as the need to match the 
development projects of flagship projects with the improvement of their surrounding 
environments tend to expose future disputes between the public and the state.90 We stress 
this not merely as an attempt to ‘identify with the marginal such as the villagers as the 
border’s development may be the project of those seeking to gain further advantage in 
society: entrepreneurs or affluent citizens, for example’.91 With capital from Bangkok and 
Vientiane flowing in to buy the land near the proposed bridge, any increase in land sales 
and leases to the Chinese businessmen over time are likely to stoke anti-Chinese 
sentiments among the poor villagers. As we have stated in the previous section, the 
increasing Chinese presence of migrants and cheap goods are already causing a degree of 
anxious concerns. The land conflict issues could easily worsen the situation and dampen 
interest to engage the Chinese in the border towns, because of the questioning of the 
immense political and economic competiveness posed by the Chinese. In worse 
scenarios, violent acts against Chinese migrants cannot be ruled out. In short, the 
anticipatory cross-border geopolitical relationship between the Thai-Lao border and 
China also hinges upon the policies pushed by the Thai and Lao central governments, and 




WHO BENEFITS MORE WITH CHINA? A BRIDGE THAT CONNECTS AND 
DIVIDES CHIANG KHONG AND HOUAY XAY 
 
China has replaced Thailand as the biggest foreign investor in Laos for the 
first time in five years… Thailand was the top investor in Laos from 2005 to 
2009 before losing the position to China due to a rapid increase in Chinese 
investment over the first two quarters of this year. Chinese companies have 
decided to invest in 16 projects with a total value of US$344 million over the 
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past six months, while Thai firms decided to invest in only 4 projects worth 
just US$3.7 million over the same period.92 
The above quote reflects a new geoeconomic reality in the economic (re)development of 
Laos. Thailand had been the traditional country to lead economic development in Laos 
until after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, where a weakened Thailand left Laos 
to embrace an emerging China in attracting much needed investments to its poor 
economy.93 In a similar vein, the proposed bridge mirrors the new geoeconomic reality as 
well. Although China and Thailand each shares half of the cost for the mega 
infrastructure project, China’s relatively much stronger economic prowess propels itself 
ahead of Thailand to expand its footprint in Laos. The acknowledgment of this new 
geoeconomic reality is clearly salient, as cross-border ties between Chiang Khong and 
Houay Xay are progressively more influenced by China. For example, people in Chiang 
Khong may feel Houay Xay will gain more with China through the bridge given the 
closer proximity to the Chinese border. As such, perceptions on which side of the border 
benefits more through the bridge with China in time matters in influencing the overall 
anticipatory geopolitical relations between the Thai-Lao border and China. 
People living in Chiang Khong are aware that even though with the construction of 
bridge, Thailand still does not share a border with China, hence the interviews elicited a 
tinge of ‘jealousy’ towards Houay Xay: 
 
Laos shares a direct border with China. Laos has also so many new improved roads 
from Houay Xay to Yunnan. All these improvements are done with Chinese help.94 
 
I think Chiang Khong will not benefit much from China. There should be more 
Chinese businessmen in Laos. Laos is closer to them. It is easier for them to do 
business there.95  
 
Although their views may not be wholly representative of Chiang Khong, the thoughts 
expressed suggest they perceive Houay Xay will benefit more with China through the 
bridge. Lintner also observes that Laos is becoming more land-linked through roads and 
rail to other neighbouring countries despite being a land-locked country96, which support 
the perceptions of the two interview quotes that Houay Xay will get closer to China in 
trade links. 
While there are claims that Houay Xay will benefit more than Chiang Khong with 
China through the future bridge, ‘voices’ from the Lao side of the border offer alternate 
perspectives:  
 
Houay Xay is just a transit town where Chinese goods come through here to go 
Thailand, and Thai goods pass here to go Yunnan.97 
 
The bridge will bring more people to Houay Xay. But they won’t stay here for long. 
Tourists will leave soon after one to two days. They will go to Luang Prabang They 
will go to China or return to Chiang Khong. Houay Xay will still be very much a 
transit town even when the bridge is completed. We don’t have many attractions like 
Luang Prabang.98 
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The idea of Houay Xay as a transit town is evident in the minds of the people living 
there. First, the transit perception is perhaps justified by the fact that China last year 
became Thailand's top export destination, replacing the United States, as it imported 11% 
of all Thai exports.99 Houay Xay is the town to pass through for Thai goods taken to 
Yunnan on road after crossing the Mekong River on ferry. Second, Houay Xay is the 
second preferred choice after Vientiane to set off tour visits to Luang Prabang via the 
slow boat services.100 
These underlying thoughts are telling signs that the proposed bridge is not spared 
from the dynamics of rivalry shared by Chiang Khong and Houay Xay in the cross-border 
geopolitical relationship with China. The concerns are to be taken note in relation to the 
rising geoeconomic clout posed by China, because each side of the border perceives the 
other as the party that will benefit more with China in terms of economic development. 
The value of geoeconomics as an analytical framework proves valuable in examining the 
underlying tensions as it is concerned with the geographical distribution of wealth, 
drawing links between economic flows and the national/border economies of China, 
Chiang Khong and Houay Xay. Geoeconomics manipulates the imaginaries of future 
visionaries of prosperity because people at the Thai-Lao border have different 
expectations of what the bridge can offer to the towns of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay. 
In addition, the anticipatory geographies uncovered in Chiang Khong and Houay Xay 
reflects the geoeconomic conceptions of space, power and security as relational to an 
external party (China). In this sense, geopolitics is recalibrated by market logics101, and 
the geopolitical relationship between the Thai-Lao border and China hinges on the 
dynamics of geoeconomics.  
Economic (re)development projects at the borderland could represent a perfidious 
impediment for prosperity or a tantalizing window of opportunity at one or both side(s) of 
the border. The bridge as symbolized by China’s immense financial clout sensationalizes 
the perceptions of impediment and opportunities among the people living in Chiang 
Khong and Houay Xay as in who gains more or less across the Mekong River. It is a 
bridge that will connect the towns closer and faster physically and yet can divide them 
culturally and politically in future economic development with China.  
 
 
AN ANTICIPATORY CONCLUSION: TAKING HEED OF LOCAL ‘VOICES’ 
AND BORDERLAND TRANSFORMATIONS 
 
 
Indeed, a bridge links local communities, but also articulates with and makes 
movement possible between far distant ones.102 
 
The changeable nature of cross-border spaces suggests that to some degree they are 
based on “imaginary” spaces envisioned by politicians.103 
 
Geoeconomic visionaries tend as a result to anticipate capitalist inclusion rather than 
the expulsion or containment of others. Their focus is on networks not blocs, 
connections not walls, and transborder ties instead of national territories.104 
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The above quotes capture and summarize our purpose of uncovering the anticipatory 
geographies surrounding the proposed bridge at the Thai-Lao border towns of Chiang 
Khong and Houay Xay we expounded in our article. The three quotes suggest imaginaries 
of connectivity that promise hope through the eyes of the central governments. These 
include closer foreign ties, increased wealth and improved infrastructure through the 
proposed bridge in our empirical study of the three countries (China, Laos and Thailand). 
However, hope is not envisioned the same way at the border towns. The three 
empirical sections have underscored the need to listen to local perceptions at the Thai-
Lao border as they signal potential ill- feelings that could translate into discriminatory 
practices or even violence towards Chinese migrants in future. The detrimental effects 
would then jeopardize future cross-border geopolitical ties and trade between the Thai-
Lao border and China. Having said that, we have also shown how grounded research 
carried out exclusively at borders are often and perhaps too emphasized on the affairs of 
the two countries that share the political boundary, missing out on how a third country 
can influence border relations between the first two states.  
 A further possible relevance and contribution of our article is on a policy level. 
Following Anderson’s urges to take anticipatory practices seriously105, such as scenario 
planning, preparedness and preemption, we seek to push the anticipatory geographies 
presented in our research to provide urgency for anticipatory practices to be drafted by 
China, Laos, Thailand and even ADB to counter any resentment towards growing 
disparities among the border towns and Yunnan through the proposed bridge. In 
particular, our work pushes critical geopolitics to be more policy relevant instead of 
becoming an academic fad.106 
We recognize that the data collected and the conclusions reached are context-based 
and are by no means representative of the entire spectrum of views in Chiang Khong and 
Houay Xay. Nevertheless, we want to stress certain anticipatory geographies that are 
likely to influence future cross-border geopolitical relations. This is especially important 
in the area of our research. First, ‘ADB officials recognize that the projects they fund are 
likely to encourage further socio-spatial unevenness, but they state that there is no other 
viable way they know of to develop the GMS’s basic infrastructure’.107 Second, in a 
recent road trip taken by the foreign ministers of the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) from Chiang Rai to Jinghong in Yunnan, the politicians are even more 
eager to explore greater connectivity through road and rail in the GMS with China and 
even India.108 Thus, there already exists a powerful political economic juggernaut based 
on certain shared regional geoeconomic imaginaries fostered by various cross-border 
infrastructure projects. 
The two reasons clearly suggest that future research must engage anticipatory 
geographies more than ever, and to create anticipatory practices. As Jim Glassman 
eloquently puts it:  
 
The GMS might bring greater peace and prosperity to peoples throughout Southeast 
Asia; it might also generate new conflicts that reflect the interests of some of the 
major actors pushing regionalization and globalization.109 
 
For example, China’s upstream projects along the Mekong have generated multiple 
conflicts of interest, anxieties and coalitions challenging certain hydro-power 
developments, which could create serious intra-regional and inter-state tensions in 
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future.110 In this paper we have focused on a new cross-border bridge that is less 
controversial than the contested waterscapes of the Mekong, but even so, there are 
numerous unintended and potentially contentious issues that are likely to arise. Certainly 
the bridge is already harbinger of socio-economic and political changes, including an 
Chinese presence; investors from Kunming, Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Vientiane; 
transnational capitalizing on cross-border and riverside land development; and increasing 
local awareness of “pattana (development) GMS” . Then the crucial take home message 
here is to listen to the local ‘voices’ at the economic borderland because the actual 
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